Keeping abuse out
An open PDS with no invite codes is a standing offer to anyone who wants free accounts on a federated network. Tophhie Social has been attacked and has had bot sign-up waves, and most of the controls below were added in response to specific incidents rather than designed up front.
The controls
Section titled “The controls”| Control | Protects | Added |
|---|---|---|
| Email-based 2FA, via PDS Gatekeeper | Sign-in and sensitive actions | Since launch |
Rate limiting on com.atproto.server.createAccount |
Account creation | Tightened after October 2025 |
| ASN and IP blocking | Account creation | October 2025 onward |
| hCaptcha on the sign-up form | Account creation | March 2026 |
| Cloudflare DDoS mitigation and WAF rules | Everything | Ongoing |
| Human review of account deletion | Destructive actions | Policy |
PDS Gatekeeper
Section titled “PDS Gatekeeper”The reference PDS exposes administrative and sensitive XRPC endpoints. PDS Gatekeeper sits in front of them, and is also what provides email-based two-factor authentication for every account.
The pattern is worth noting. Rather than forking the reference PDS to add authentication requirements, the protection is a separate service in the request path, so the PDS stays stock and upgradeable.
The October 2025 attack
Section titled “The October 2025 attack”A DDoS aimed squarely at com.atproto.server.createAccount: 282 accounts created in 60
seconds, from varying US ISPs and hosting providers. The server was overwhelmed and became
unavailable.
There were two failures, and the second was worse than the first. Rate limiting existed but
did not work, because the logic failed to block repeated createAccount calls, and a
control that is present but ineffective buys false confidence. Automated recovery then did
not fire either: workflow logic flaws meant the incident response never triggered, and
restoration was manual.
No data was compromised. The attack targeted availability rather than confidentiality.
Afterwards the rate-limit thresholds were lowered and the logic fixed, and network security rules were added to block traffic matching known bot and attacker patterns.
The March 2026 bot wave
Section titled “The March 2026 bot wave”A rise in bot account creation, addressed with a different tool. hCaptcha was added to account creation, and the stated effect is that programmatic account creation is no longer possible, whether by calling the endpoint directly or going through the API.
Alongside it, rate limits were tightened further so fewer requests are allowed and lockouts last longer, an entire ASN was blocked along with specific IP addresses, and the Tophhie Cloud API’s sign-up endpoint was retired.
That last one is the most transferable decision here. Two ways to create an account means two sets of controls to keep in sync, and the second one is always the one that gets forgotten. Removing the path is stronger than defending it.
Moderation
Section titled “Moderation”Account review and deletion happen through an admin web interface, at
admin.tophhie.social.
The stated position is that account deletion should always be reviewed and executed by a human being, and bot accounts are not auto-deleted on detection. The reasoning is straightforward: a false positive in an automated deletion pipeline destroys a real person’s account, and getting that wrong costs more than having a human look first.
Invite codes
Section titled “Invite codes”Sign-ups are open. describeServer reports inviteCodeRequired: false, and the trade-off is
accepted knowingly, because openness is what makes the controls above necessary.

